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Abstract
Regulation may inhibit or stimulate technological change. The relationship depends on
the technology of regulation—the design and instrument choice of regulatory policy. This
essay examines the history of economic and social regulations over the last three decades,
the explanatory power of theories of regulatory politics, the choice of regulatory instru-
ments, the assessment of regulatory impacts, and the inﬂuence of each of these on the inno-
vation and diﬀusion of technology (and of regulation). It concludes with recommendations
for the future of regulation and technology.
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1. Introduction
Technology and regulation are often posed as adversaries. Technology symbo-
lizes markets, enterprise, and growth, while regulation represents government,
bureaucracy, and limits to growth. The modern regulatory era, beginning in the
1960s, has regularly pitted calls to restrain technological risk through regulation1
against the competing concern that regulation could unduly hobble new technology
and progress. In the 1970s that debate focused on technologies such as nuclear
power, supersonic transport, and food additives. Today the debate continues as
fears of technologies such as electromagnetic ﬁelds, greenhouse gas emissions, and
genetically modiﬁed foods spark new calls for precautionary regulation.el of experts studying the
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tutional factors such as regulation clearly have a major inﬂuence on the rate of
technological change and thus on societal prosperity [2]. Technological change is
generally credited with half or more of productivity growth [3: p. 171]. As Schumpeter
argued, the process of ‘‘creative destruction’’ by entrepreneurs who devise new
ways of producing goods and services is potentially a far more potent source of
progress than is short-term price competition [4]. And regulation can retard all
of Schumpeter’s three stages of technological change: invention, innovation, and
diﬀusion.
But the standard juxtaposition of regulation and technology has not gone
unchallenged. First, many have argued that technological change itself can reduce
risks by introducing superior new methods of production [5]. Among the evidence
for this claim is the steady rise in life expectancies (almost doubling, from about 45
in 1900 to about 80 in 2000, in the US and most other wealthy countries) over the
era of rapid technological advance. In more speciﬁc ways, newer products and
devices are often less dangerous and less polluting than older ones, suggesting that
regulation meant to reduce risks should not inhibit new technology. Second, some
have hypothesized that regulation could improve, rather than inhibit, businesses’
innovative edge and competitiveness [6]. In the stronger version of this hypothesis,
regulation stimulates the ﬁrm to conserve resources and switch to cleaner sub-
stitutes in ways that actually save the ﬁrm money. In the weaker version, even if
such moves are costly to the ﬁrm, regulation enables ﬁrms in countries that regu-
late ﬁrst to take the lead in selling new technologies to countries that follow.
A fundamental weakness in all of these claims is the depiction of regulation as a
single kind of rule or strategy. Regulation is treated as if it comes in one type and
has only one eﬀect on technology, like an engine transmission that can shift into
only forward or reverse. In reality, just as there are many diﬀerent types of tech-
nologies, there are many diﬀerent types of regulations. Diﬀerent regulatory instru-
ments, such as technology requirements, performance standards, taxes, tradable
allowances, and information disclosure, can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on techno-
logical change and other important consequences.
Indeed, if technology is understood in its broad sense—as not just hardware or
equipment or sprockets or chips, but as any device or system for converting inputs
into outputs, for changing the production function—then regulation is itself a tech-
nology. Regulation is a set of techniques for changing production functions to pro-
duce fewer of some outputs, such as pollution, or more of others. Regulation is the
technology of governance. The terminology that regulatory scholars use to analyze
regulation invokes this technological view: we speak of ‘‘instrument choice’’ as in
medicine or music, of choosing ‘‘policy tools’’ from the ‘‘regulator’s toolkit’’, and
of ‘‘reinventing government’’ to achieve goals more successfully. The inﬂuence of
regulation on technology is critically dependent on the technology of regulation.
Diﬀerent regulatory designs can impede or accelerate technological change, or
shape it in varying ways, favoring some kinds of technology over others.
This essay highlights several of the most salient developments in US regulation
over the last three decades and their eﬀects on technological change. First, we have
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on industries such as trucking, airlines, and banking), simultaneous with the
explosive growth of social regulation (health, safety and environmental rules, also
known as risk regulation). This change is ironic because it contradicts what had
been the leading theory of regulatory politics, namely that concentrated industry
groups would capture regulation and bend it to serve their own interests.
Second, over the last three decades, there has been a major shift in the debate
over the design of social regulation from moralistic to pragmatic terms, with a con-
comitant rise in the use of incentive-based instruments such as tradable allowances.
In the 1970s, much regulation required installation of speciﬁc technology, and a
common objection to tradable allowances was that they amounted to ‘‘licensing the
right to pollute’’. Today that debate has ended as environmentalists, industry and
the public now focus on whether regulatory instruments eﬀectively achieve risk
reduction and at what cost. Ironically, the technology requirement approach
turned out to be less eﬀective at stimulating technological change than performance
standards and tradable allowances.
Third, a major development over the past three decades has been the rise of
governance by assessment: technology assessments to forecast the social and econ-
omic impacts of new technologies, and regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to
forecast the social and economic impacts of new regulations. These assessments
are usually conducted ex ante, before the decision to adopt the new technology
or regulation, and that is an important step. But we have had too little retro-
spective empirical investigation of the actual impacts in practice of alternative
regulatory designs on important consequences such as health outcomes and
technological change. Accordingly, we have cultivated too little regulatory
innovation—Schumpeterian entrepreneurship in the public sector—to devise alter-
native regulatory designs, test them in practice, and thereby select the best per-
forming approaches.2. The changing politics of regulation
In the 1960s, the US federal regulatory regime was comprised mostly of econ-
omic regulation assembled over the preceding decades: price and entry controls on
industries such as agriculture, energy, trucking, airlines, telecommunications, and
banking. Apart from food and drug law, there was comparatively little federal
social regulation of health, safety and environmental risks. With this history, it
may not be surprising that the leading theory of regulation held that industry
would dominate regulatory politics, lobbying for regulations to shield business
proﬁts and against regulations that would burden industry. The theory argued that
political activism is costly, and that where the beneﬁts of regulation are widely
shared, individual beneﬁciaries will face strong incentives to free ride by letting
others pay the costs; thus, regulations yielding public goods enjoyed by the general
public (and imposing costs on concentrated interests) will go underprovided. But
regulations yielding special beneﬁts to concentrated groups will be more frequently
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be expected to dominate other special interests in this game, and regulation will
largely serve industry’s interests.2 This theory suggested that economic regulation
would endure while social regulation remained dormant.
But the subsequent history of regulation does not ﬁt this story. First, starting in
the mid-1970s, economic regulations were repeatedly dismantled in a wave of
deregulation. Antitrust enforcement targeted alleged monopolies in telecommunica-
tions and computing. Prominent examples include the deregulation of airlines,
banking, and trucking, and the breakup of the AT&T telephone monopoly. Econ-
omic deregulation was advocated and led by academics serving in government,
including Alfred Kahn and Stephen Breyer; it proceeded aggressively during the
Carter administration and had broad bipartisan support.3 The eﬀects of economic
deregulation on technological innovation are ambiguous; larger ﬁrms or those
earning extra proﬁts due to entry barriers may have more resources to invest in
R&D, but less competitive pressure to do so or to adopt new technology, whereas
smaller ﬁrms in more competitive markets may have greater incentives to innovate
but fewer resources.4 Meanwhile, the quasi-monopoly rights, such as patents and
copyrights used to encourage technological innovation, have been strengthened in
the last few decades, so much so that some critics now argue that intellectual pro-
perty rights have become too strong and are barriers to a shared commons of ideas
that undergirds collaborative innovation [12].
Second, an explosion of social regulation began around 1970. President Nixon
organized the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, and Congress enacted a
string of powerful new laws, including the Clean Air Acts of 1970 and 1977, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, and
the hazardous waste laws of 1976 and 1980.
These two waves remade the modern regulatory state into its present pattern of
much diminished economic regulation and much invigorated social regulation.
Ironically, this pattern and its evolution are the opposite of that predicted by the
prevailing theory of regulation from the 1960s [13,14]. Perhaps it was impossible to
predict these changes in the 1960s; it is always hard to see a revolution when one is
in the middle of it.5 One possibility is that the 1960s theory was just overdrawn, in
the sense that political costs and free riding do explain the enduring predominance
of special interest legislation over general interest legislation, but that industry2 The industry-capture hypothesis was espoused by scholars on the left, e.g., Kolko [8] and on the
right, e.g., Stigler [9].
3 See, for example, Niskanen, and Kearney and Merrill [10]. Economic deregulation has since spread
worldwide. See Ref. [11].
4 For an overview, see Council of Economic Advisors [3: pp. 173–193].
5 Kahn and Wiener [15], who were otherwise prescient about manifold social trends, gave little atten-
tion to the coming environmental movement and the rise of social regulation. As early as 1974, scholars
of regulatory politics began to observe that the rise of social regulation had not been well explained by
the 1960s political theory. See Posner [16].
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political advantage. Yet it is diﬃcult to attribute the wave of environmental
legislation in the early 1970s to the inﬂuence of environmental and consumer
advocacy special interest groups, because most of them had not yet formed at that
time.6
A second possibility is that the 1960s theory holds true in ordinary times, but
that occasional ‘‘republican moments’’ (perhaps fueled by dramatic news events
such as rivers burning and oil spills) galvanize broad public opinion and overcome
special interest opposition [18]. That may be so, given the major social reform
movements that arose in the 1960s, but it fails to explain why such republican
moments occur only when they do, nor does it account easily for the continued
growth of social regulation in the 1980s and 1990s.
A third possibility is that the 1960s theory remains valid, on the view that the
1970s social regulation was actually driven by subgroups of industry to serve their
own parochial advantage by raising rival ﬁrms’ costs [19]. That may explain some
key aspects of the new laws, but it fails to account for the origin of the broad new
body of legislation that surely did burden industry.
A fourth possibility is a hybrid of the second and third: that an unusual but very
potent coalition of environmentalist ‘‘Baptists’’ and industry ‘‘bootleggers’’ came
together to secure the passage of new laws that both protected public health and
provided parochial gains to one industry subgroup against another.7 This coalition
theory is reinforced by the theory that political entrepreneurs saw openings to
advance legislative agendas that would satisfy voters’ inchoate but impending pre-
ferences.8
These theories of the politics of regulation bear directly on the relationship of
regulation to technological change. If the wave of 1970s social regulation were sim-
ply industry capture or an environmentalist republican moment, its eﬀects on tech-
nology might be positive or negative. But the Baptists and bootleggers coalition
implies a regulatory design outcome that is more likely to retard technology. The
Baptists in this story were the environmental movement, who saw growth, tech-
nology, capitalism, and markets as the enemy of ecology. The Limits to Growth
school, the Club of Rome, the Small is Beautiful movement, the extreme Deep
Ecologists, and related exponents were not merely pro-environment, they were
often (especially at the extremes) decidedly anti-technology. To be sure, many
environmentalists were sensible advocates of desirable restrictions on excessive pol-6 Moreover, if interest group politics are ‘‘limited to [industry], they are often inaccurate. They cannot
fully explain environmental, health, [and] safety regulation. . . If the theory is expanded beyond produ-
cers, it risks becoming nonpredictive and nonexplanatory. All regulatory rules and programs beneﬁt
some group or other’’ Breyer [17].
7 Yandle [20]. The theory of ‘‘Baptists and bootleggers’’ takes its name from Sunday liquor closing
laws, which beneﬁt both of these factions. For a critical review of these theories, see Wiener [21].
8 On the ability of political entrepreneurs to appeal to voters’ potential preferences, see Arnold [22]
and Wilson [13: pp. 357, 370–371]. But such a strategy presupposes latent or rising public preferences,
see Denzau and Munger, and Schroeder [23].
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some were advocates of forcing new more benign technologies. But many feared
that technology and growth would yield ‘‘overshoot and collapse’’. They saw the
environment as scarce and economic resources as vast (hence regulation is not
costly).
The Bootleggers, meanwhile, were often the organized existing industry seeking
to impose cost barriers to deter potential new entrants [24]. Much of the 1970s
regulation took the form of special higher burdens imposed only on new sources:
new source performance standards and new source review for factories and electric
utilities, special restrictions on air pollution in the sunbelt, special controls on new
automobiles, and extra restrictions on new chemicals and new pesticides. Thus,
both Baptists and Bootleggers favored regulatory designs that impeded technologi-
cal change.
The Limits to Growth movement was opposed by many, including brazen tech-
nological optimists who saw any restrictions as anathema, and more moderate crit-
ics who agreed that some risks were worth regulating but advocated regulatory
designs that used economic incentives to be less costly and less inhibiting of inno-
vation. The extreme technological optimists saw technology and growth as the sol-
ution to all problems, including environmental problems; they saw the environment
as vast and the economy as scarce (hence regulation is quite costly).
Both of the extremes were wrong, because both neglected the crucial role of pri-
ces and institutions. If economic growth yields resource scarcity and if that scarcity
is reﬂected in prices, then markets respond by conserving and ﬁnding substitutes;
there is no collapse. Hence optimist Julian Simon won his famous bet with pessi-
mist Paul Ehrlich because they bet on metals, which are priced in markets and
avoided scarcity through price signals that motivated conservation, substitution,
new exploration, and thus declining real prices. But if growth yields scarcity that is
not reﬂected in prices (i.e., resource depletion that is external to markets), then
markets will not respond, conservation and substitution will not occur, and serious
depletion can occur. Thus, clean air, clean water, and biodiversity can be depleted
by pollution and land clearing, with adverse eﬀects that are not reﬂected in the pri-
ces of the depleting activities (externalities), with no incentive for markets to con-
serve or substitute. In short, there can be real market failures. Social regulation
seeks to remedy such market failures by introducing incentives into markets to
‘‘internalize the externalities’’. If Ehrlich and Simon had bet on the ‘‘price’’ of
clean air or biodiversity, then (apart from social regulation), Ehrlich might have
won. Institutions matter: scarcities must be internalized into market transactions to
induce desirable levels of resource use.
The coalition of Limits to Growth Baptists with existing industry Bootleggers is
visible today in the coalition of environmentalists advocating the ‘‘Precautionary
Principle’’ (requiring strict regulation of uncertain new technological risks) along
with industry seeking protection against foreign competition or new entrants (such
as foreign or new methods of genetically modiﬁed agriculture). Opponents of pre-
caution argue that such restrictions will stiﬂe technological change. But the main-
stream view has moved toward the understanding that the key is whether
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embraced both the need to regulate important risks, and the need to do so in a
way that avoids inhibiting growth and innovation, indeed attempts to stimulate
innovation. That is the basic underpinning of ‘‘sustainable development’’, the
vague but widely adopted term introduced in 1987 to reconcile environmental pro-
tection with economic development, and also of the economist’s recipe for incen-
tive-based regulatory instruments that cost-eﬀectively reduce risks while
encouraging ﬂexibility and innovation.3. The choice among regulatory instruments
During the growth of social regulation over the last 30 years, the debate over
regulatory design has matured from moralistic to pragmatic. In the 1970s, a strong
theme was the juxtaposition of good versus evil, of white hats versus black hats,
and of the need to expiate the sin of pollution [25]. Economic incentive instruments
such as taxes and tradable allowances were excoriated as ‘‘licensing the right to
pollute’’. This mindset was of a piece with the social movement that saw capitalism
and markets as the cause of pollution, and therefore rejected the economists’
notion that markets could also be a solution. The result was a series of major laws
and agency actions to rebuke markets, mandating instead that industry adhere to
prescriptive conduct requirements, including requirements to install speciﬁc ‘‘best
available control technology’’.
Over the last 30 years, there has been signiﬁcant innovation in the choice of
regulatory instruments. This has been reform of social regulation, not deregulation.
Newer regulatory programs have introduced economic incentive instruments
designed not to contradict market forces but rather to ‘‘reconstitute’’ markets by
introducing price signals that internalize externalities, reduce pollution, and induce
ﬂexible, creative, innovative responses by ﬁrms [26]. From the initial generation of
command-and-control technology requirements, regulatory design has graduated
to setting performance standards (such as emissions limits that leave to the ﬁrm the
choice of how to reduce emissions), emissions taxes, emissions allowance trading,
and information disclosure rules.
The type of regulatory instrument matters [27]. Technology requirements, inten-
ded to force industry (or at least new and modifying sources) to upgrade, may fos-
ter the diﬀusion of existing technology across industry, but ironically may stagnate
innovation of new technologies by specifying a particular technology and giving no
incentives for further improvements [28]. Once scrubbers are mandated, ﬁrms have
few incentives to invent a better method. Because the government is typically
behind the curve of technology (compared to industry), and because regulations
take years to promulgate and enforce, the ‘‘best technology’’ mandated by regu-
lation may often be inferior to the best that industry could actually deploy. More-
over, imposing extra requirements on new sources encourages ﬁrms and motorists
to keep older facilities and vehicles in operation longer, retarding the diﬀusion of
new equipment and worsening pollution [24].
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ﬂexibility to choose the methods of compliance. If the government mandates a
maximum level of emissions, then ﬁrms may choose among, say, scrubbers, lower-
polluting materials and fuels, and alternative production methods, and they face
continuing incentives to innovate and adopt new methods that reduce the cost of
limiting emissions to meet the performance standard.9 Diﬀerent types of perform-
ance standards matter: limits on absolute emissions may encourage reductions,
while limits on the rate of emissions per unit of product output may perversely
encourage increased output [29].
Taxes and tradable allowances oﬀer ‘‘how’’ ﬂexibility and an additional aspect:
‘‘where’’ ﬂexibility, that is, the ﬂexibility to locate emissions reductions where they
are least costly. For example, assume the government wants to reduce pollution by
two units from an industry of two ﬁrms, A and B, which currently emit three units
each for a total of six. If the government requires a speciﬁc control technology
designed to reduce emissions by one unit at each ﬁrm, that will cost each ﬁrm, say,
US$ 100 for a total of US$ 200 and two units reduced. If the government sets a
performance standard requiring each ﬁrm to reduce emissions by half to one unit,
that will cost ﬁrm A the same US$ 100 (it installs the same technology) but ﬁrm B
only US$ 20 (it has a cheaper option) for a total of US$ 120 and two units reduced.
A and B both now also have an incentive to ﬁnd even cheaper new ways to avoid that
unit of emissions. If the government instead issues each ﬁrm two allowances to emit,
and makes these allowances tradable, then ﬁrm A will oﬀer to pay ﬁrm B something
over US$ 20 (but under US$ 100) to get B to sell one unit allowance to A (which will
then own three allowances and emit three units), and reduce an extra unit at B (at B’s
cost of US$ 20; B will then own one allowance and emit one unit). The result is a
total cost of US$ 40 and two units reduced. As this example illustrates, innovation in
regulatory design from technology requirements to performance standards to allow-
ance trading accomplishes the same aggregate emissions control (two units)10 at
decreasing cost, from US$ 200 to US$ 120 to US$ 40.
Tradable allowances have now been used successfully in a wide range of applica-
tions, including to phase lead out of gasoline in the 1980s; to phase out chloro-
ﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) that deplete stratospheric ozone, pursuant to the 1987
Montreal Protocol; to cut sharply emissions of sulfur dioxide under the 1990 Clean
Air Act acid rain program—at dramatic cost savings compared to nontrading9 Some argue that although technology requirements may be more costly and less innovation-friendly,
they are easier to monitor than performance standards. Yet monitoring the installation of the tech-
nology is not the same as monitoring actual environmental performance; and the added costs of per-
formance monitoring are often far outweighed by the beneﬁts of performance standards over technology
requirements. Moreover, this debate points out that well-designed performance standards can stimulate
innovation in monitoring technologies, by oﬀering greater credit for better-monitored emissions reduc-
tions.
10 The example assumes equal beneﬁts regardless of where the emissions reductions occur, as would be the
case for a well-mixing pollutant with global but no local eﬀects, such as carbon dioxide. Trading allowances
of a pollutant posing local ‘‘hotspot’’ eﬀects would require a more complex analysis. SeeWiener [30].
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ances may be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.11
Taxes have been used less often in the US, but more often in Europe [32]. Mean-
while, another incentive-based instrument, information disclosure, has been used
widely, including to make government decisions more transparent (through the
freedom of information and environmental impact statement laws), to reveal and
reduce releases of toxic substances (through the Toxics Release Inventory), and to
publicize workplace risks (through OSHA’s hazard communications standard). In
addition to the innovation of these new technologies of regulation, there has been
considerable diﬀusion as well, with countries borrowing approaches from each
other to apply to similar and even diﬀerent problems [33: p. 1295; 34].
Why did this reform occur? Industry might be expected to lobby against incen-
tive-based approaches because taxes and tradable allowances force ﬁrms to pay for
every unit of emissions (by controlling some emissions and paying the tax, or fore-
going the allowance sale revenue, on the remaining uncontrolled emissions),
whereas technology requirements and performance standards put no cost on the
residual uncontrolled emissions they permit [35]. And in the past, many envir-
onmentalists opposed tradable allowances as an immoral license to pollute. But the
rising costs of rigid regulation, the cost-saving rewards of incentive-based approa-
ches (including the ability to ‘‘buy’’ more pollution control at the same or lower
cost), the eﬀorts of EPA staﬀ and White House leadership to innovate cost-saving
ﬂexibility, the eﬀorts of policy entrepreneurs such as the pro-incentive group
Environmental Defense (and, in the case of acid rain, the fortuitous shift of polit-
ical leadership in the Senate from Robert Byrd of West Virginia to George Mitch-
ell of Maine), all combined to shift regulatory politics toward increasing use of
incentive-based regulations [36].
In the wake of this trend and the success of tradable allowance systems in prac-
tice, one almost never hears the old epithet about ‘‘licensing the right to pollute’’.
Of course that accusation never stood up, because traditional technology require-
ments and performance standards also licensed the right to emit the permitted
level, and for free, whereas tradable allowances and taxes make the ﬁrm pay for
every unit of emissions. The evolution from the old moralistic debate to the current
pragmatic debate marks a healthy maturation of regulatory policy. Regulatory
design should be about consequences—what works, how much, with what costs
and side eﬀects. Ironically, if the moralistic contention is that those who stand in
the way of pollution reduction are immoral, and if incentive-based approaches are
more eﬀective in reducing pollution (such as by stimulating greater technological
innovation), then those who on moralistic grounds advocate cumbersome11 Stewart and Wiener [31]. An important new area of research on regulatory design investigates how
the optimal instrument choice depends on the underlying legal framework, such as the voting rule for
the adoption of policy. Under majority rule, instrument choice can be imposed on dissenters. But under
policy adoption by consent, as is the rule for international treaties, then important dissenters (e.g.,
China or even the US) must be attracted to participate via side payments, which must be compatible
with the regulatory instrument. See Wiener [27].
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mitting their own sin.12
It is clear that the move from technology requirements to either performance
standards or tradable allowances improves the incentives for technological inno-
vation by oﬀering ‘‘how’’ ﬂexibility. More innovation is achieved by requiring
results, not by requiring installation of a speciﬁc recent innovation. There remains,
though, some debate whether tradable allowances stimulate innovation as com-
pared to uniform performance standards without trading. Incentive-based taxes
and tradable allowances promote dynamic innovation and diﬀusion because they
give sources a continuous incentive to improve abatement methods [38]. Every unit
of uncontrolled emissions is a cost to the ﬁrm in extra taxes or allowance sale rev-
enues foregone. Sources can increase their proﬁts by devising or adopting new
abatement methods that are less costly than the expected cost of paying the tax or
allowance price. But critics argue that emissions trading does not promote inno-
vation, compared to a performance standard set to achieve the same aggregate
reduction (and assuming allowances were issued for free), because under trading
the high-cost ﬁrms will undercontrol while the low-cost ﬁrms will overcontrol, so
the net eﬀect on innovation is a wash, or emissions trading is even worse because it
lowers costs and that reduces the incentives to innovate (presuming that innovation
is driven by higher costs of abatement) [39]. But this argument neglects the incen-
tive under emissions trading for all ﬁrms to avoid the costs of buying allowances
by devising more cost-eﬀective methods to control than their competitors; all ﬁrms
compete to overcontrol and sell allowances, because every uncontrolled unit repre-
sents a cost of foregone allowance sale revenue—an incentive not provided by uni-
form performance standards. Ultimately, we need empirical comparisons of these
instruments in practice.13 And, of course, innovation is not per se desirable; there
can be excessive investments in innovation. If emissions trading dampens incentives
for innovation at high-cost ﬁrms by allowing them to ﬁnance abatement at low-
cost ﬁrms, thereby reducing overall costs compared to a ﬁxed performance stan-
dard, that means trading reduces total costs, which is socially desirable. Requiring
high-cost ﬁrms to spend on innovation would just raise total costs for the same
pollution control result.1412 Wiener [27: pp. 723–25]. A similar point is made by Rose [37].
13 Some empirical evidence favors the view that emissions trading stimulates more innovation than
would equally stringent performance standards [40].
14 Another question is whether taxes and tradable allowances have diﬀering inﬂuences on innovation.
In principle they can be set to have identical eﬀects. But emissions trading may stimulate more optimal
innovation under uncertainty about costs. See Gruenspecht and Lave [41]. The logic is that if investment
in innovation is driven by the volume of abatement activity to which it can be applied, a tax that yields
overcontrol of emissions (because true abatement costs are lower than expected costs) will induce over-
investment in innovation, which further reduces abatement costs and further compounds the degree of
overcontrol. A tax that yields undercontrol of emissions (because true abatement costs are higher than
expected costs) will induce under-investment in innovation, which keeps abatement costs high and com-
pounds the problem of undercontrol. An emissions quantity rule, by contrast, ﬁxes the level of abate-
ment and thus induces closer to optimal investment in innovation, with no perverse feedback eﬀects.
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beginning of this essay over whether regulation inhibits or stimulates technological
innovation. In its stronger form, the Porter hypothesis states that regulation pro-
motes the adoption of newer cost-saving technology [6]. But if so, then one won-
ders why ﬁrms do not adopt it anyway; what is the market failure? Possible
answers include internal gaps in the accounting of costs within the ﬁrm [42], and
spillover beneﬁts or economies of scale that discourage one ﬁrm from adopting a
new technology unless other ﬁrms do as well [3: p. 200; 43]. But studies ﬁnding
cost-saving in terms of material inputs (e.g., reduced energy costs) may be omitting
the opportunity costs of other technologies foregone and of managerial time used
to devise the method to comply with the pollution regulation instead of pursuing
other opportunities. The empirical evidence indicates little support for the strong
form of the hypothesis [44,45]. In its weaker form, the Porter hypothesis concedes
that regulation is costly, but urges that ﬁrst-adopters can gain a competitive advan-
tage over second-adopters when regulation in the ﬁrst country is imitated by other
countries. The validity of this eﬀect depends on other countries imitating the ﬁrst-
adopter quickly enough to stimulate demand to enable the ﬁrst-adopter to recoup
its costs plus more, while not so quickly that the second-adopters could take the
ﬁrst-adopter’s market share.
Moreover, the incentive to adopt new technology depends importantly on the
type of regulation. If the initial regulation is technology-speciﬁc, then the incentive
to adopt the cost-saving technology may be missed; if the initial regulation is tech-
nology-speciﬁc, and the second-adopter countries do not require the same tech-
nology, then the ﬁrst-adopter advantage may be lost. Regulations oﬀering ‘‘how’’
ﬂexibility, such as performance standards, taxes, and tradable allowances, will
therefore all be much more eﬀective in achieving the gains promised by the Porter
hypothesis than technology requirements.4. Regulatory impact assessments and outcomes
The growth of social regulation since the 1970s has motivated a parallel increase
in White House review of such regulation. Every president since Jimmy Carter has
ordered an economic analysis of new agency regulations: President Carter issued
Executive Order (EO) 12044, President Reagan issued EO 12291, and President
Clinton issued EO 12866. The Reagan order required every new regulation to be
accompanied by an RIA that evaluated the rule’s beneﬁts and costs, and it desig-
nated the Oﬃce of Information and Regulatory Aﬀairs (OIRA) within the Oﬃce of
Management and Budget (OMB) as the body to review RIAs. The Clinton order
reiterated the beneﬁt–cost test (while changing its terms from beneﬁts must ‘‘out-
weigh’’ costs to beneﬁts must ‘‘justify’’ costs), and added instructions to evaluate
the adverse side eﬀects of regulations on health and environment; to assess quali-
tative and distributional impacts; and to ensure the transparency of OIRA review.
The current Bush administration is continuing to operate under the Clinton order,
indicating bipartisan continuity on the parameters of executive branch review.
J.B. Wiener / Technology in Society 26 (2004) 483–500494The process of executive review reﬂects the recognition that the technology of
regulation, like any technology, may have complex multidimensional impacts. Just
as any new technology may have unintended consequences, so may new regula-
tions. OIRA review helps identify such consequences and ensure a thorough,
coherent analysis before the regulation is deployed [46]. Yet, to date, this analysis
has been more successful in assessing the short-term costs and beneﬁts of regu-
lation than it has in forecasting long-run impacts on technological change.
Apart from costs, an important concern is that regulations intended to reduce
one risk may induce other countervailing risks or reduce additional ancillary risks
[47]. To cite a few examples, medicines (from aspirin to vaccines) have adverse side
eﬀects; banning one chemical may introduce harmful substitutes; airbags in cars
may save adults but kill children; reducing fossil fuel combustion may increase
reliance on nuclear energy; police chases to catch ﬂeeing suspects may kill bystan-
ders. Each regulatory intervention creates a vector of eﬀects, a portfolio of ripples.
Countervailing risks are not just an automatic homeostatic or gremlin-like reac-
tions to eﬀorts at progress.15 Rather, they arise from narrow interventions into the
real world of complex systems and interconnected webs, with multiple eﬀects.
Narrow regulatory designs exacerbate such tradeoﬀs; more comprehensive regu-
lation can internalize what would otherwise be regulatory externalities. In this
respect, regulatory instruments are like medicine: a technology for healing that can
also hurt [50]. Responsible physicians, patients, regulators, and the public must
weigh such tradeoﬀs. Ultimately, recognition of such complexity helps to motivate
the search for risk-superior options—innovations in the technology of regulation
that reduce multiple risks in concert. Examples include the 1990 Clean Air Act
x612, which provides for CFC substitutes to be regulated to reduce their ‘‘overall
risk’’, including eﬀects on ozone depletion, global warming, toxicity, and other
impacts; and the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act amendment authorizing the EPA
to weigh risk tradeoﬀs where reducing one water contaminant could increase others
and to adopt standards that minimize ‘‘overall risk’’. Often such risk–risk analyses
and risk-superior regulatory innovations will in turn stimulate innovations in priv-
ate technology, such as ‘‘smart’’ air bags that deploy more softly at smaller occu-
pants, or vaccines with fewer side eﬀects.
Risk regulation may now be at a stage of understanding similar to medicine in
the 19th or early 20th century, when it was still debatable whether medical treat-
ment did more good than harm.16 Early medical care often did net harm (as it still
does sometimes today) [50]. The objective should be innovations in regulatory
design that progressively increase the net good they accomplish.15 For such a view, see Tenner [48]. For a critique of such claims of automatic perversity, see Hirschman
[49].
16 The political scientist Russell Hardin cites John Mueller for the view that economics has reached the
point that it may now generally be helpful to governmental economic policymakers, just as the Flexner
Report of the American Medical Association concluded that around the beginning of the 20th century,
going to an American doctor ﬁnally was more likely to beneﬁt people who were ill than to harm them.
See Hardin [51], citing Flexner and Mueller [52].
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The inﬂuence of regulation on technology is complex, and depends on the tech-
nology of regulation—the design and instrument choice of the regulatory inter-
vention. After the last three decades of regulatory experience, we are poised to
make additional progress, but several issues need to be addressed.
First, we need to cultivate policy entrepreneurs. Just as Schumpeter highlighted
the pivotal role of private entrepreneurship (and there is a growing movement of
social entrepreneurship [53]), we need to stimulate policy entrepreneurs—not just
political entrepreneurs who seize opportunities to advance agendas,17 but policy
innovators who will develop and test new forms and approaches to regulation for
greater eﬀectiveness, less cost, less caustic side eﬀects, and other desirable attributes
[54]. The study of policy innovation starts from the proposition that there is no
single universal best policy design, or best regulatory technology. Instead there are
contextual criteria for success, which imply diﬀerent regulatory designs for diﬀerent
problems, situations, societies, and institutional settings. We must test policy ideas,
learn from empiricism, and adapt regulatory technology over time.
Second, we should build on the experience with tradable allowance systems to
see the more general lesson—that reconstituting markets by creating ‘‘regulatory
property’’ can be a highly successful antidote to failures in private property mar-
kets. Both economic and social regulations are responses to market failures: inad-
equate property rights undermining the incentive to invest in innovation; excessive
property rights creating barriers to entry and monopoly proﬁts; inadequate rights
to exclude pollution and depletion leading to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’.
Attempts to remedy these property rights failures via centralized command regu-
lation have also failed, whether in the former USSR, or in American central
government economic regulation, or American centralized social regulation. But
that does not mean that there is no role for central government. The lesson is to
move toward internalizing externalities by reconstituting markets through new
‘‘regprop’’ such as tradable allowances as well as information instruments and
other creative new approaches [55].
Third, we must recognize that regulatory interventions operate in an ecological
system, by which I mean not just the ecology that some laws aim to protect but the
larger interconnected web of nodes and strands into which regulation seeks to
introduce change. That change is inevitably multi-dimensional. Insistence on nar-
row regulations triggered by emerging risks, such as strong versions of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, will founder amidst this complexity [56]. If the Precautionary
Principle means (as some versions state) that any new technology must be blocked
until its proponents demonstrate that it poses no risk or is safe, then the recog-
nition that regulation itself is a technology, and poses potential countervailing17 As noted by Schumpeter [4: pp. 269–270] (emphasizing the ‘‘vital fact of leadership’’ in democracy);
also at p. 282 (political leaders are entrepreneurs who shape public preferences). Also, Wilson [13: pp.
370–371].
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this paradox is a multi-risk portfolio approach and risk-superior solutions.
Fourth, we should foster networks for the diﬀusion of regulatory innovations.
Just as private technology diﬀusion is crucial to economic prosperity, so the dif-
fusion of improved public regulatory technology is crucial to social progress.
Fifth, the experience of the last three decades, and its contradiction of the lead-
ing theory of regulatory politics at the outset of this era, should make us circum-
spect about our current theories of regulatory politics. Our current explanatory
theories may do better at predicting the last decades than the next. We may soon
need a new theory to explain unexpected developments yet to come.
Sixth, a key frontier for regulation and technology is the global commons. If we
are to have any success in addressing problems such as global climate change, the
engagement of major developing countries will be essential. A key challenge for the
new technology of regulation will be to engage developing countries in producing
global public goods without coercion. And the global stage will also be crucial for
the innovation and diﬀusion of new private technologies, such as lower green-
house-emitting energy technologies for rapidly developing economies. Ideally, these
two challenges will dovetail: new regulatory approaches will engage major develop-
ing countries in part by promising a ﬂow of technological innovations.
Seventh, we must become more regular empiricists about our regulatory designs.
Does regulation inhibit or stimulate technological change? How does that depend
on the technology of regulation? We have deployed regulation for three decades
with increasing ex ante analysis of its predicted impacts, but too little ex post
analysis of its actual impacts. The ﬁeld of empirical retrospective analysis of regu-
latory impacts is in some ways just beginning [40,44,57]. We need far more work in
this area, to study the multidimensional consequences of regulation, what works,
how much, at what cost, with what side eﬀects, compared to what alternatives. In
turn, this retrospective analysis should help us revise our methods of ex ante pre-
dictions of new regulations.
Most generally, we need to develop an institutional structure that rewards policy
innovation [58]. In the case of private-sector technology, we typically reward inno-
vation through ﬁnancial incentives, either by conferring quasi-monopoly intellec-
tual property rights on inventors or by paying bounties to award-winning ideas.
Whether these kinds of reward systems can be usefully applied to motivate public-
sector policy innovation is far from clear. Conferring property rights in legal inno-
vations—regprop for new regprop, as it were—poses immediate problems of
restricting public access to new legal ideas, private sales of new legal ideas, the dis-
tribution of such rights (to academics? to judges?), and excessive incentives to
overproduce new law.18 If these reward systems are deemed inappropriate, the
question must be, compared to what alternative? That is, we will need to promote18 Wiener [33: pp. 1369–71] (discussing pros and cons of property rights in legal rules to encourage pol-
icy innovation); Ayres [59] (the idea of giving intellectual property protection to true innovations in
regulation ‘‘should not provoke such a visceral gag reﬂex’’).
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(which in turn should promote private-sector technological innovation). That
multi-tiered set of incentives for innovation poses an apt challenge for the next
three decades of regulation and technology.References
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